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Abstract 
Reliability is especially important for autonomous 
underwater vehicles (AUVs) that have made the transition 
to operational use. However, in contrast to the unmanned 
air vehicle community, there has been little sharing in the 
open literature of detailed fault histories of commercial 
AUVs from which an assessment of their reliability can be 
made. In this paper, we declare the fault history of two 
REMUS-100 AUVs manufactured by Hydroid Inc. and 
operated by the Center for Coastal Marine Sciences at 
California Polytechnic State University. The data set 
contains the faults and incidents recorded from 186 
missions between 5 November 2003 and 14 January 2009. 
Interaction between the faults or incidents with the AUV 
and the operating environment complicate matters when 
it comes to estimating probability of loss. Through a 
formal process of eliciting expert judgment the paper 
provides optimistic and pessimistic estimates of loss of 
the REMUS vehicles in open water, coastal, under sea ice 
and under ice shelf operations. Vehicle-specific risk 
mitigation methods are explored, and recommendations 
made for reviewing the fault history data using 
behavioural aggregation through interaction among a 
group of experts rather than simple mathematical 
aggregation as in this paper. 
 
1. Introduction 
Reliability is especially important for autonomous 
underwater vehicles (AUVs) that have made the transition 
to operational use.  A few research groups that have built 
their own AUVs, or modified commercial vehicles, have 
attempted statistical analyses of fault and incident logs 
(e.g. Griffiths et al., 2003; Podder et al., 2004), and a high-
level analysis of the availability of the commercial 
HUGIN vehicles operated by C&C Technologies has 
been presented (Chance, 2003). However, in contrast to 
the unmanned air vehicle (UAV) community (e.g. OSD, 
2003), there has been little sharing in the open literature of 
detailed fault histories of commercial AUVs from which 
an assessment of their reliability can be made. 
With commercial UAVs used by the military it is clear 
that extensive record keeping, aggregation and sharing of 
data on faults and incidents has led to robust statistics that 
have been used to improve reliability over two decades, 
both in the US and in Israel. Their extensive experience 
does highlight a central issue for AUVs and for this paper: 
the large difference between the fault rate and what the 
UAV community terms the mishap rate. Mishap is defined 
as the loss of an aircraft, loss of human life or damage in 
excess of $1m. OSD (2003:27) lists the Mean Time 
Between Faults (MTBF) of several UAVs, notably the 
RQ-1A Predator at 32 hours, the RQ-2A Pioneer at 9.1 
hours and the RQ-5 Hunter at 11.3 hours (post 1996). In 
contrast, the mishap rates for these three vehicles were 32, 
334 and 55 per 100,000 hours respectively.  These imply 
ratios of mishap-to-fault of 98, 33 and 161 respectively. 
With AUVs, while we may have sufficient knowledge and 
experience to assess MTBF, we generally have insufficient 
information to assess directly the mishap rate. And yet, as 
AUVs are being used in more challenging environments, 
operators and owners do need to know the risk of loss or 
severe damage to their vehicles. 
In this paper, we set out how such an assessment can 
be made using a case study based on the fault history of 
two REMUS-100 AUVs manufactured by Hydroid Inc. 
operated by the Center for Coastal Marine Sciences at 
California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly). The 
data set contains the faults and incidents recorded from 
186 missions: 89 with vehicle Boomerang I between 18 July 
2001 and 19 October 2008, and100 with Boomerang II 
between 5 November 2003 and 20 February 20091.  
The faults and incidents with the vehicles are set out in 
a spreadsheet available online2, with the key points 
described and discussed in section 2. Simple fault/incident 
history statistics are derived in section 3. The challenge of 
deriving the probability of loss (this is equivalent to the 
UAV mishap), based on expert judgment, is discussed in 
sections 4 and 5. Interaction between the faults or 
incidents with the AUVs and the operating environment 
complicate matters, and affect profoundly the risk of loss. 
We have previously argued that those interactions cannot 
be determined mathematically (Griffiths and Trembanis, 
2007; Brito and Griffiths, 2009). However, they can be 
estimated through a formal process of eliciting expert 
judgment. The alternative, frequentist, approach to 
estimating the probability of loss of an AUV in different 
operating environments is impractical. It would require 
counting the number of missions and number of losses in 
different environments for a particular vehicle type. 
Obtaining such a data set is a worthy goal, difficult for a 
single AUV operator, but could be a community effort. 
This community approach has been followed with UAVs, 
and hence they do have frequentist estimates of mishaps. 
Section 6 uses an extended Kaplan Meier non-parametric 
analysis to provide graphical visualisations of the 
estimated probabilities of loss of REMUS100 with 
mission distance in four environments: open water, 
coastal, under sea-ice and under shelf ice. Such an analysis 
informs risk mitigation measures. Section 7 presents our 
conclusions.  
 
2. The fault and incident histories of two 
REMUS-100 AUVs. 
2.1 Background to v ehi c l e c on fi gur at ion s and us e . 
The REMUS-100 vehicles operated by Cal Poly are used 
for a range of missions to better characterize and improve 
understanding of coastal waters, Moline et al. (2005). The 
vehicles have been fitted with a wide range of sensors, 
including a non-standard Ocean Sensors OS200 CTD, a 
bioluminescence bathy-photometer, nets with bottles to 
capture animals that have passed the photometer, other 
optical instruments – the Wetlabs ECO-series backscatter-
fluorescence sensor, a Satlantic OCR-507I irradiance 
sensor and a OCR-507R radiance sensor, and a 1200kHz 
                                                           
1 Mission descriptions are available at  
http://www.marine.calpoly.edu/auv/REMUS/index.php  
2 Available via a link at 
http://www.noc.soton.ac.uk/nmf/usl/gxg/EEJ_REMUS.html  
ADCP (figure 1). Operating depths during missions may 
be shallower than 2m, hazards include areas of kelp and 
manmade structures such as piers. Different forms of 
navigation have been used depending on requirements. 
Most frequently, the vehicles operate within the coverage 
of a network of digital acoustic transponders, with an 
Ultra-Short Base Line unit on the vehicle determining 
range and bearing to the transponders, whose positions 
have been previously fixed, and their locations pre-
programmed into the AUVs. Long Base Line Navigation 
by triangulation is also used to a maximum range of 
2.5km. When acoustic navigation is not available the 
vehicles use dead reckoning based on compass and 
Doppler Velocity Log (or propeller revolutions) to update 
the last good acoustic or GPS fix. 
  
 
Figure 1. Example of the more unusual sensors fitted to the Cal 
Poly REMUS-100 vehicles – a bioluminescence bathy-
photometer, at the top, and two nets and collection bottles 
attached to the exhaust ports to collect samples, from Moline et 
al. (2009). 
 
Missions have taken place in Avila Beach, Huntington 
Beach, Imperial Beach, La Jolla, Monterey Bay, Morro 
Bay, Pismo Beach, Sand City, San Diego Bay, Santa 
Barbara, CA; Sarasota, FL, Buzzards Bay, Hadley 
Harbour, Woods, Hole, MA; Castine, ME, the Great Bay 
area, NJ; Sequim Bay, WA and Svalbard, Norway. The 
median mission lengths were 14.3 and 13.9km for 
Boomerang I and II respectively, with lower quartiles of 3.8 
and 5.7km and upper quartiles of 41.5 and 36.9km, and 
maxima of 53.8 and 59.06km. The batteries fitted – four 
26V 10Ah lithium ion packs were capable of providing 
power for distances of up to 80km at 3 knots. 
2 .2 Ov erv i ew o f t h e fault  and i nc ident  hi story 
The fault and incident history for these two REMUS-100 
vehicles was quite unlike that of the Autosub vehicles 
studied previously. Autosub missions generally exhibited 
different technical problems, which were almost always 
corrected before subsequent missions, or manifested 
themselves in different ways (e.g. where the root cause 
was an intermittent connector). Here, the REMUS 
vehicles exhibited 37 unique faults or incidents3, many 
recurred (some, years apart) but often in different 
combinations. For example, the fault ‘depth sensor noisy’ 
first encountered on mission 7 (29 July 2001) occurred 
alone on eight further missions and in combination with 
one or more other faults 33 times. This pattern of faults 
and incidents affected the philosophy of the subsequent 
analysis, as discussed in section 4. 
A detailed reading of the list of unique fault and 
incident log will show very few instances of hardware 
problems, such as on mission 147, ‘Batteries were low and 
finished mission, due to broken charging station after 
prior mission.’ Unique faults due to software were also 
infrequent, such as, ‘Warning: Vehicle Bioluminescence 
data is old, due to Software error’, first encountered on 
mission 1 and recurring on 14 missions. More common 
were incidents related to the environment. For example, 
where the vehicle could not dive on first attempt due to 
sea conditions or the buoyancy trim. In the majority of 
these instances the vehicle tried again using a ‘porpoise’ 
mode. More complex incidents often occurred when 
operating close to the seabed.  
A number of incidents also occurred because of 
mission imperatives. Missions that were run overnight, for 
example, from nearshore to offshore and back sought to 
minimise risks while offshore even at the expense of 
accepting greater risks during the final stages nearshore, 
where recovery would be easier, for example, by setting a 
lower-than-usual threshold for acceptable remaining 
battery energy. 
 
3. Simple statistics on faults and incidents 
The mission statistics in Table 1 include estimates of 
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and its distance 
equivalent, Mean Distance Between Failures (MDBF). 
Both are defined simply as:  
MTBF = Total Hours/Total Failures 
MDBF = Total Distance/Total Failures. 
These definitions are as used by the US Army, and more 
generally, for UAVs (OSD, 2003). They do not derive 
from records of the actual time interval between 
individual faults. 
On first reading these statistics look unimpressive, 
significantly worse than the RQ-2A Pioneer UAV with a 
MTBF of 9.1 hours, for example. However, as noted 
above, a small number of recurring minor faults 
                                                           
3 See tab “Unique Faults – Incidents” in the fault and incident 
spreadsheet available via a link at 
 http://www.noc.soton.ac.uk/nmf/usl/gxg/EEJ_REMUS.html  
dominated the MTBF calculation.  Seven out of 37 unique 
faults or incidents were responsible for 467 (92%) of the 
total of 507 problems logged, distributed as shown in the 
Pareto plot of Figure 2.  
 
Table 1 Simple statistics on the fault or incident rates for two 
REMUS100 AUVs. 








Combined 189 4031 507 1.28 7.95 
Boomerang 1 89 1811 265 1.04 6.83 
Boomerang II 100 2220 242 1.54 9.17 
 
 
Figure 2. Pareto plot of the frequency of recurrence of those 
faults or incidents where there was more than one instance.  
 
Despite these faults or incidents, 173 of the 189 
missions (91.5%) were considered to have been 
successful.  Only on 28 missions (14.8%) were there 
aborts not called for by the operators (the operators 
initiated 31 aborts for reasons such as sailboats nearby, or 
wanting to end missions early). 
Despite the overall level of success, much would be 
gained by the retirement of the seven recurring items, 
which were described as follows (comments from a 
Hydroid engineer are in italic): 
1 - Warning: Vehicle Bioluminescence data is old, due to 
software error. 
7 - Depth sensor noisy (example last 3 readings 5.4 5.9 
6.7m). Self test failure depth sensor, pausing mission. 
Sensor misread, single value missed, happened before 
mission started. This is often seen 'on the bench' with many 
sub-systems running. 
11 - REMUS has ground fault: 0V reference is shorted to 
seawater. Pin connection poor resulting in GFI, no 
affect on mission. Most often this is found to be a user 
problem in fitting the dummy plug. If encountered, GFI faults 
will halt a mission from starting, but will NOT abort a mission 
if they emerge when underway. 
12 - Vehicle stuck on surface; attempting to drive it down. 
Delay is vehicle dive due to buoyancy (10-20s), no 
affect on mission. Sea conditions/buoyancy may prevent 
vehicle diving first time. If so, vehicle tries again using a 
'porpoise' mode. 
15 - Self test failure attitude (tilt), pausing mission. Vehicle 
rolled to side after trying to avoid bottom, everything 
okay. Vehicle uses combined ADCP beams as altimeter. 
When sensed as too close to bottom vehicle pitches up and 
propeller stops, the tilt is therefore outside normal limits. When 
vehicle assumes proper attitude, propeller starts and mission 
continues. 
28 - Vehicle at low altitude. Executing emergency climb, 
too close to bottom, hit bottom and bounced. 
Controlled climb only good to 10˚ pitch, to get more than that 
propeller is stopped. 
47 - Ocean Sensors salinity out of range, bad conductivity 
reading. 
 
4. Eliciting expert judgment on probability of 
loss 
It is accepted that when eliciting expert judgment to build 
a risk model a formal elicitation process should be 
followed that reduces biases and the possibility for 
disagreements. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) studied the 
nature of different types of biases. Experts usually 
introduce biases by following mental shortcuts such as 
availability, representativeness, or anchoring. A formal 
elicitation exercise consists of the following sequential 
steps: 1) Specifying the purpose; 2) Selecting the experts; 
3) Clearly define the issues; 4) Training the experts; 5) 
Analysing and aggregating; and 6) complete analysis write 
up. This process is generic and some phases do overlap.  
Whilst the sequence of the process is invariable, the 
activities that take place in each phase may vary. The 
process is typically tailored according to the type of 
application, expert’s availability and the facilitator’s4 
familiarity with advanced statistical methods.  
                                                           
4 Facilitator is the person that performs statistical analyses of the 
expert judgments. 
In this research we attempt to combine features of 
formal elicitation process proposed by O’Hagan (2009) in 
the SHELF package, with features of formal elicitation 
presented in Otway and Winterfeldt 1992). One aim is to 
reduce the number of experts needed and therefore to 
reduce the time taken to create the risk model. 
The SHELF process involves three classes of actors: 
the elicitation manager, the facilitator, and the experts. 
SHELF calls for five experts, one elicitation manager and 
one facilitator. Here we had responses from four experts. 
We used a combined elicitation manager and facilitator, an 
approach accepted by Otway and Winterfeldt (1992), and 
denoted as the decision maker.   
The following sections outline the set of activities 
undertaken by the decision maker in each phase of the 
formal judgment elicitation exercise. 
4.1 The purpo se . 
The purpose of the study is to build a risk model for 
Remus100 operation in four environments: open water, 
coastal, sea ice and ice shelf. The risk model was based on 
the vehicles failure and incident history and the 
probability of these failures resulting in AUV loss.  
4 .2 Se l ec t ing  the exp er t s . 
The expert selection was conducted with three 
requirements in mind:  
1) Independence between the experts and the institution 
responsible for the AUV operations (Cal Poly). 
2) To use a number of experts who have participated in 
a similar risk exercise.  
3) To invite experts that have not participated in this 
exercise but have experience relevant to this research. 
We invited six experts; four were able to submit their 
work for this study. Table 2 summarizes the experience 
and subject area for the experts.  
 
Table 2 Experts’ experience in AUV design and operation; 
expert names are abbreviated hereafter. 
Expert Application area Years of 
experience 
Adam Skarke (AS) Scientific research 4 
Rob McEwen (RM) Scientific research 10.5 
Steve McPhail (SM) Scientific research 15 
Tim Boyd (TB) Scientific research 6 
4.3 C lear l y d efin e t he i ssue s . 
A total of 507 occurrences of faults or incidents was 
noted by the AUV operations team. It would not be 
feasible to ask the experts to evaluate the probabilities 
(five values) for each of these, in four environments, a 
total for each expert of 10,140 judgments.  Instead, we 
separated out the 37 unique faults or incidents for 
evaluation by the experts (a more manageable 740 
judgments). An assessment showed that the faults or 
incidents could all be considered independent, that is, 
there was no interdependence of the fault clusters on any 
mission. In later analysis the probability of loss for each 
mission (where several faults or incidents may have 
occurred) can therefore be determined from the individual 
elicited values for each unique fault from: 
 P(loss) = 1–(1-P1)*(1-P2)…(1-Pn) (1) 
The experts were asked to provide five measures of 
the probability of a fault or incident resulting in loss, 
rather than a single probability judgment as was the case 
in the earlier Autosub3 exercise (Griffiths and Trembanis, 
2007). By asking the expert to provide five measures, it is 
possible to better evaluate the skewness and tails of the 
distribution; the five measures being: 
1. The lower bound, L. The minimum value that P(loss) 
can take.  
2. The upper bound, U. The maximum possible value of 
P(loss).   
3. The median, M. The value for which there is 50% 
chance of P(loss) being above or below it.  
4. The lower quartile, LQ. The value for which there is 
50% chance that P(loss) is between U and LQ and 
50% chance that it is between LQ and the median. 
5. The upper quartile, UQ. The value for which the expert 
is 50% confidence that P(loss) is between the median 
and UQ and 50% confidence that it is between UQ 
and the upper bound.  
The description of each operating environment from 
Griffiths and Trembranis (2007) was given to the experts.  
4.4 Training  exper t s and e li c i t ing  judgments . 
Experts AS and RM received training on how to assign 
probabilities to events in a previous risk assessment 
exercise. Two Experts SM and TB were for the first time 
participating in this type of exercise. All experts were 
asked to keep in mind the fact that losing a REMUS100 is 
a rare event; neither of the two Calpoly vehicles had been 
lost in 189 missions. An example elicitation was emailed 
to each expert and a webpage was created to store any 
misconception introduced in the fault description. The 
experts were also asked to keep in mind the fact that some 
of the faults were caused because of the characteristics of 
the operating environment and the configuration in which 
the vehicle was being deployed.  
4.5 Ana ly sing  and Aggr egat ing . 
It is possible to analyse in detail those faults that present 
huge disagreement between experts. It is the approach 
necessary when using behavioural aggregation with the 
experts present in person. It can also be done by feedback 
to each expert and asking for a review of their judgments. 
However, this process is time consuming, and, given the 
constraints imposed on this study, it was decided not to 
analyze discrepancies in judgments but to aggregate the 
experts mathematically into two schools of thought, the 
optimists and the pessimists, as we had done in the 
previous Autosub3 study. This provides a useful 
indication of the range of judgments. 
A beta distribution (constrained between 0 and 1) was 
fitted to the five probability estimates for each unique 
event in each environment elicited from each expert, and 
subsequently aggregated after deciding whether the expert 
was an optimist or pessimist for each event in each 
environment.  
4.6 Comp let e anal ysi s and wri t e up. 
In a formal judgment elicitation exercise, once the expert 
judgments are analysed a preliminary report is prepared 
and sent to the experts. The aim is to allow experts to 
review their judgments and if possible to rectify their 
judgments according to any misconceptions. This article is 
the first publication of our preliminary assessment.  
 
5. Remus100 Risk Model 
5.1 Judgment  Ana ly si s . 
The cumulative distribution of the expert judgments 
provides a means to assess visually whether an expert uses 
lower probability ranges or, on the contrary, an expert 
uses high probability ranges for mission failures or 
incidents. As an example, figure 3 presents the cumulative 
distribution for the judgments provided by each expert for 
mission 140, here the environment is coastal water.  
The probability judgement for mission 140 is a result 
of the combination of judgments provided for single 
failures 12 and 15 (see section 3 for descriptions) together 
with a low battery state. From figure 3 it is notable that 
experts AS and SM use lower probability ranges than 
experts RM and TB. Thus for this mission and 
environment, experts AS and SM’s judgments were 
aggregated to form the optimistic group and experts RM 




Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of the probability judgments 
provided for mission 140, coastal water environment, as an 
illustrative example. SM in dashed gray; AS in dashed black; RM 
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Figure 4. Frequency distribution for the cluster of optimistic 
(opt) and pessimistic (pess) experts. 
This example is not untypical; in many cases experts’ 
judgments spanned two orders of magnitude or more in 
probability of loss. Figure 4 presents the frequency 
distribution showing how often each expert was deemed 
optimistic or pessimistic. For all environments, judgments 
provided by RM and TB were consistently classed as 
pessimists. For open and coastal water, and under sea ice, 
judgments from SM were more often optimistic than 
pessimistic. For the ice shelf environment SM was classed 
as pessimistic in 63% of the missions and optimistic in 
37%. For all environments, AS had over 70% of his 
judgments classed as optimistic.   
It would be illuminating to revisit this data set and 
analysis using a behavioural aggregation approach, where 
the experts would be required to reach a single agreed 
distribution. The arguments for lower or higher 
probability of loss would need to be made and consensus 
reached. The factors discussed would undoubtedly cast 
light on the judgment process and the perceived severity 
(or not) of the faults and incidents. 
Given the large number of instances of the same few 
faults we sought to establish whether they dominated the 
overall results. Table 3 shows the implications for coastal 
water (the environment in which the missions were run). 
Where the experts are declared optimists (AS and SM), 
with the single exception of mission 28 for AS, the 
contributions to the total probability of loss from these 
recurring faults are low compared to the higher 
probabilities of loss given for more serious single mission 
faults or incidents by these experts. This was because their 
estimated probabilities of loss from the single occurrence 
of each recurring fault were very low. 
However, for TB the total probabilities from these 
recurring faults are of the same magnitude as for the more 
serious faults and incidents, while for RM two out of the 
seven recurring faults collectively reach a similar 
magnitude to the more serious faults. As these do have a 
profound effect on the overall results for these two 
experts, a means of reaching consensus is needed to 
bottom out the issues and perceptions with these 
recurring faults. 
Table 3 For the coastal water environment, the elicited median probabilities from each expert (‘Single’, Ps) for the faults that 
recur frequently (shown by mission number of first occurrence and the frequency count C), together with the total 
contribution to the probability of loss when the single mission value is applied to all occurrences (Pt=1-(1-Ps)^C). 
Cou n t  T B  A S  R M  S M  Mission  
 Sing l e  Total  Sing l e  Total  Sing l e  Total  Sing l e  Total  
1  4 9  5e -3  2.2e - 1  0  0  0  0  2e -6  9.8e - 5  
7  4 2  5e -3  1.9e - 1  6e -5  2.5e - 3  1.5e - 3  6.1e - 3  1e -5  4.2e - 4  
1 1  3 6  5e -3  1.7e - 1  0  0  2.5e - 4  9e -3  2e -5  7.2e - 4  
1 2  133  5e -3  4.9e - 1  8e -5  1e -2  1.5e - 3  1.8e - 1  1e -5  1.3e - 3  
1 5  115  5e -3  4.4e - 1  6e -6  2.2e - 4  5e -4  5.6e - 2  1e -6  1.2e - 4  
2 8  4 1  5e -3  1.9e - 1  3e -3  1.2e - 1  3e -2  7.1e - 1  4e -5  1.6e - 3  
4 7  3 6  5e -3  1.7e - 1  6e -6  2.2e - 4  3e -4  1.1e - 2  2e -6  7.2e - 5  
 
Table 4 lists the top risk for each expert in the coastal 
water environment, with a description of the fault or 
incident as provided the expert and the notes from the 
expert when available. AS has the highest risk of loss at a 
median of 0.05; the other experts have medians of 0.5 (TB 
and RM) and 0.8 (SM) for their highest risks. RM 
considers four faults or incidents to be equal top risks, 
one of which (18) is the top risk for TB and another (94) 
to be one of the two top risks for AS. Only SM considers 
the incident on mission 189 to be a top risk.  
Table 4 For the coastal water environment, the elicited median probabilities from each expert for their top risk(s) from the 
list of 37 unique faults/incidents, together with the fault or incident description (with the text in italic being the comment of 
a  Hydroid engineer, and the text in blue has been added in response to the questions raised by TB) and the justifying text 
from each expert where provided.  
 
Expe r t  Mission  Median 
 P(loss)  
Fault or incident 
description 
Expert’s justifying text (if provided) 
TB 18 0.5 Sank at base of pier, retrieved.  
Was not moving. This 
occurred because one of the 
attached sensor's O-ring failed; 
the AUV filled with water, 
changing buoyancy.  The only 
reason it returned to the pier 
was because the RPMs were 
high enough to maintain flight.  
When it reached its destination 
it sunk to the bottom, where it 
was located and retrieve d .  
Why did the vehicle sit motionless on the bottom?  Did it 
leak? Was it ballasted improperly?  The vehicle should be 
slightly positively buoyant.  Assuming all that is known of 
the fault is as described here: vehicle sank on deployment, 
then the issue (of loss) is relatively simple:  in water depths 
> rated depth (100m) P(loss) is 1.  Assuming 'coastal' 
means <100m, probability of successful recovery is pretty 
good. Probability of sinking due to a leak (assuming 
pressure vessel was checked) is relatively low. Most likely 
is ballasting error, e.g. for wrong salinity, and the vehicle 
might be floating at an intermediate depth, which would 
be harder to recover from.  (Edited form)  
94 0.05 Transponders reversed so 
vehicle got confused, almost 
went into rocks until we 
rescued it. Transponders have 
unique identity and preprogrammed 
locations in vehicle command file. 
Mismatch may lead to vehicle 
navigation erro r s .  
P(loss) is significant given the proximity of the AUV to a 
rocky shoreline during the navigational fault. Collision 
with a rock shoreline at speed would certainly result in 
loss. A high se state would also increase this dange r .  
AS 
97 0.05 Under pier, stopped mission to 
prevent vehicle damage .  
P(loss) is significant since I assume the AUV is among 
numerous pilings that support the pier. Collision potential 
is very high. This risk would be heightened by a high sea 
state, which could batter the AUV against the pier pilings.  
18 0.5 As abov e  
52 0.5 Science bay leakin g .  
87 0.5 Caught in eelgrass, but freed 
itself. Vehicle will try both forward 
and reverse thrust if it considers it is 
not making way .  
RM 
94 0.5 As abov e .  
 
SM 189 0.8 Caught under kelp raft, was 
not able to call or get GPS for 
4 hours, had to do old fashion 
current and wind calculation to 
get vehicle general area and use 
distance pinger to find vehicle.   
Success, we found it. 
I'm assuming 50% loss probability in such a scenario, 
based on the description .  
 
Having considered the treatment by the experts of the 
frequently occurring faults or incidents, and their top 
risks, overall visual impressions of the risk profiles by 
expert in each environment can be gleaned from the 
cumulative frequency plots in Figure 5. Note that the 
probability (Y axis) scales for the open water and coastal 
environments are from 0 to 0.3 compared with 0 to 1 for 
the under ice environments. In open and coastal waters 
AS and SM’s assessments show why we considered them 
optimists, their median and upper quartiles are at a low 
probability of loss. For SM the sharp rise occurs at the 
90th percentile; AS also shows a sharp rise, but it is not 
until the ~98th percentile and it is of lower magnitude. In 
these two environments TB is the most pessimistic below 
the ~65th percentile, after which RM becomes the most 
pessimistic expert, a school of thought he exhibits clearly 
for the two under ice environments. 
Figure 5 Cumulative frequency plots for each environment with each expert’s assessment computed from the unique faults to 
encompass the faults or incidents on all 189 missions. As an example of how to read these plots, the point on the Y axis 
corresponding to 50% on the cumulative frequency scale on the X axis is the median probability of loss from that expert, 
similarly the upper and lower quartiles can be read at cumulative frequencies of 75 and 25%. 
5.2 Aggreg at ion . 
Having considered the responses from each expert 
individually, the next stage is aggregation. The judgments 
were aggregated using a linear pool for the mean of each 
probability judgment. A beta distribution was fitted to 
each probability range elicited from the experts; an 
algorithm was implemented in the R statistical software 
package to perform this fitting automatically using a 
simple optimisation algorithm (R, 2009; Nelder and Mead, 
1965). 
The shape of the beta distribution is controlled by 
hyper-parameters α and β. The mean and variance for 
each mission were calculated using these hyper-parameters 
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The aggregated cumulative frequency plots of the 
probability of loss in each environment are shown in 
Figure 6. The school of thought  - optimist or pessimist – 
has a greater influence that the environment within each 
pair – open/coastal and sea/shelf ice. There is little 
distinction between the probability of loss of the optimists 
and the pessimists in the open water and coastal 
environments from their judgments. For sea ice and shelf 
ice RM was considered to be the only overall pessimist 
based on the cumulative frequency plots (figure 5). The 
gap between his assessments and those of the other three 
experts does need to be reconciled. 
 
6. Survival model 
6.1 Model met hodol ogy 
A model that can be used to predict the probability of 
survival for one of these vehicles in a declared operating 
environment, based on the data and judgments collected 
here, is useful to the responsible owner. Such a model can 
be used to answer questions such as, “What risk of loss is 
there for one of these vehicles when undertaking a 25km 
mission under the sea ice conditions envisaged in the 
study?” The simple model derived here uses the extended 
Kaplan Meier approach (Brito, Griffiths and Trembanis, 
2008) to estimate and present visually the probability of 
survival with mission distance. The extension to the 
standard Kaplan Meier non-parametric lifetime estimator 
is to use the probability of survival instead of the usual 
censored flag, to give the probability of survival: 
! 




    (4) 
where ni is the number (of missions) at risk immediately 
prior to range ri and where there is a probability pi that the 
ith fault is fatal. 
6.2 Model r esult s 
Figure 7 presents the results for all four environments. 
Each sub-figure shows the optimistic and pessimistic 
expert assessments. To give some examples of how these 
curves may be used: 
a) What is the probability of losing the AUV in coastal 
waters for a single mission of median length (14km)? 
Figure 6 Cumulative frequency plots for the aggregated optimists and pessimist(s) in each of the four environments. 
Optimistic: 0.003 
Pessimistic: 0.019 
b) How many missions of this median length would 
there be before the probability of loss was 50%? 
Optimistic: 232  
Pessimistic: 36  
Given the vehicles had completed 189 missions, 
although with testing incidents, it does suggest that 
the pessimistic estimates are too pessimistic. 
c) What is this in mean distance to loss (mishap), and 
how does this compare with UAVs? 
Optimistic: 3248km, ratio of 408 between faults and 
mishaps, compared with ~100 for military UAVs 
(OSD, 2003).  
Pessimistic: 504km, ratio of 63. 
d) What is the probability of losing the AUV for an 
under sea ice mission of 25km?  
Optimistic: 0.046 
Pessimistic: 0.22 
e) How many missions of 25km under sea ice would 
there be before the probability of loss was 50%? 
Optimistic: 15  
Pessimistic: 3 
Figure 7. Kaplan Meier non-parametric survival graphs for the four environments for judgments from the optimists and 
pessimist(s). 
6.3 Ri sk mit ig at ion st r at eg y 
Brito, Griffiths and Trembanis (2008) showed that the 
shape of the Kaplan Meier curve for Autosub3 suggested 
an effective risk mitigation strategy. The probability of 
survival decreased markedly for missions of less than 
25km, followed by a plateau as range increased further.  
Consequently, if the AUV was monitored over an initial 
distance, in waters where recovery could be effected if a 
fault developed, the probability of a fault emerging during 
the unmonitored phase would be reduced. This was 
expressed as a conditional probability of losing the vehicle 
before a distance x, given that the vehicle had survived a 
lesser distance y, as equation 5: 
! 
P(X < x | X > y) =
F (x) " F (y)
1" F (y)    (5) 
For the REMUS100 vehicles studied here, there is 
much less of a steep decline followed by a plateau in risk 
as a function of distance in the Kaplan Meier plots of 
Figure 7. The gain is marginal. In the case of a sea ice 
environment for the optimistic experts, the probability of 
losing the vehicle over 25km is 0.046 as set out above. If 
the vehicle is monitored for the first 15km (arrow on 
figure 7), F(y)=1-0.964=0.036, the probability that the 
vehicle survives to 40km (F(x)=1-0.927)=0.073), an 
additional run of 25km is 0.038. This is a small reduction 
over the 0.046 for a 25km run without an up-front 
monitoring distance.  
What appears more important from this fault and 
incident history and the experts’ assessment of impact is 
to avoid missions over 40km where the probability of 
survival apparently decreases markedly. 
 
7. Conclusions 
With 189 missions completed spanning nearly eight years 
a wealth of experience has been gained with the two 
REMUS100 vehicles operating in mainly coastal waters. It 
is important to reiterate that 91.5% of the missions were 
considered to have been successful and that aborts not 
called for by the operators only occurred on 14.8% of the 
missions. On a number of the missions considered high 
risk, the operating team were prepared for the scenarios 
based on previous experience with the vehicles and the 
environmental setting. Three of the experts that took part 
in this study considered that loss on one or more missions 
was as likely or more likely, than recovery; that is, they 
assigned a probability of loss of 0.5 or greater.  
It is important to note that REMUS was initially 
intended for primarily locating mines on the seabed.  
Operations by Cal Poly have strayed from this for 
oceanographic and near shore applications, which might 
influence performance metrics. 
The existence of a small number of recurring faults, 
encountered in different combinations, has complicated 
this analysis. It meant that it was not feasible to present 
the full data set for expert judgment, and that a 
mathematical approach based on the independence of the 
faults had to be used. Experts assessed the likelihood of 
these faults leading to loss by considering one instance, 
not by their collective effect (e.g. the fact that the incident 
first encountered on mission 12 happened 133 times). 
Despite this, overall, three of the four experts considered 
(through their judgments) these faults to be of very minor 
consequence.  
The categorisation of experts as either pessimistic or 
optimist, first seen in an earlier Autosub3 analysis, recurs 
here. However, in this study, the gap between the 
assessments of the optimists and pessimists is wider. This 
results in a large difference between the cumulative 
frequency distributions and the probability of loss at the 
longer ranges in the Kaplan Meier analyses. The difference 
is sufficiently large as to render this form of expert 
judgment analysis, reached through mathematical 
aggregation, of limited value. 
It is only to be expected that the existence of 
pessimists and optimists within our cohort of experts 
reflect the existence of pessimists and optimists over the 
risks in AUV missions throughout the developer and user 
community. Thus, there is likely to be a tendency for 
readers who are optimists to see the results here from the 
optimists as supporting their outlook.  Conversely, readers 
who are pessimistic over AUV risks will alight on results 
from the pessimists in this study.   This tendency towards 
what is termed confirmatory bias by psychologists exists 
when people misinterpret new evidence as supporting 
their previously held beliefs (e.g. Kosnik, 2008). In an 
ideal Bayesian world people would use the new evidence 
to update their beliefs, not the opposite, of using their 
beliefs to interpret the new evidence. 
One method to remove the tendency for readers to 
display confirmatory bias is to only present one set of 
results, and not those from optimists and pessimists. We 
were reluctant to use mathematical aggregation to produce 
this one result, given the wide range of judgments. 
Consequently, we plan to revisit this data set using 
behavioural aggregation. By gathering the experts together 
and facilitating a consensus on the probability of loss 
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